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INTRODUCTION
The use of independent contracting has dramatically increased over
the last decade—a phenomenon which, in part, is attributable to the changing
nature of how we work. Technology and perceptions of work-life balance
are among the factors contributing to this trend.1 Employees increasingly
seek more flexibility in work arrangements—both in terms of hours and
locations—while employers seek to reduce benefits and other labor costs.
The nature of work has similarly evolved. Workplaces are less laborintensive as jobs become automated or outsourced.2 In other cases, the
workplace itself is virtual, with work from remote locations becoming the
rule rather than the exception. The gig economy has also emerged, where
workers are labeled as independent contractors and where the “hiring party”
provides platforms for work rather than work itself.3
Against this backdrop, it is perhaps surprising that little has changed
in how the law defines “employment” and “work.” Certainly, whether a
worker is classified as an “employee” has far-reaching consequences,
including taxation, qualification for unemployment and employer-sponsored
benefits, workers’ compensation coverage, and coverage under federal, state,
and local labor and employment laws. With these issues hanging in the
balance, why has so little been done to tailor definitions of “employer” and
“employee” to the modern workplace, and what are the consequences of
Congress and the courts often failing to act in this regard?
Except in the ridesharing industry,4 the trend in the courts has been
to favor employment status and extend protections to contingent workers.5
1. Tad Milbourn, In the Future, Employees Won’t Exist, TECHCRUNCH (June 13, 2015),
https://techcrunch.com/2015/06/13/in-the-future-employees-wont-exist/.
2. See Christian Bodewig, Replacing work with work: New Opportunities for workers
cut out by automation?, BROOKINGS, (Feb. 21, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/futuredevelopment/2017/02/21/replacing-work-with-work-new-opportunities-for-workers-cut-outby-automation/; see also Gene Zaino, The Impact of Automation on the Independent
Workforce, FORBES (May 2, 2017, 09:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbeshumanre
sourcescouncil/2017/05/02/the-impact-of-automation-on-the-independentworkforce/#63ee9a175c51.
3. Emilia Istrate & Jonathan Harris, The Future of Work: The Rise of the Gig Economy,
NAT. ASS’N OF CTYS.: CTYS. FUTURES LAB (Nov. 2017), https://www.naco.org/sites/default/
files/documents/Gig-Economy.pdf.
4. See, e.g., Saleem v. Corp. Transp. Grp., Ltd., 854 F.3d 131, 134 (2d Cir. 2017)
(“black car” drivers for car service platform held to be independent contractors and not
employees); McGillis v. Dep’t of Econ. Opportunity, 210 So. 3d 220, 225 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2017) (Uber drivers held to be independent contractors rather than employees); cf. Cotter v.
Lyft, Inc., 193 F. Supp. 3d 1030, 1033–34, 1040 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (court approved settlement
that retained independent contractor status for Lyft drivers).
5. “Contingent workers” are defined as freelancers, independent contractors,
temporary workers, consultants, or other outsourced and non-permanent workers who are
typically hired on a per-project basis. They can work on site or remotely. “Gig workers’ are a
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Likewise, there are changes in the definition of who may qualify as an
“employer.” These changes are most evident in decisions holding affiliated
companies to be joint employers under a variety of scenarios, including the
extension of potential franchisee liability to franchisors6 and in
administrative and judicial decisions holding leasing companies and the
companies hiring them to be joint employers for Title VII purposes.7
In an economy where jobs are shrinking and there are no workplace
guarantees, these trends make sense, although they are in conflict with the
Trump Administration’s laissez-faire or pro-company policies in the
employment arena.8 There is also the issue of drivers for Lyft and Uber who
subcategory of contingent worker who provide services brokered through tech-based
platforms, such as Uber or Lyft. See Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc., 791 F.3d 376, 383
(2d Cir. 2015), as modified, 811 F.3d 528 (2d Cir. 2016) (interns as employees where
employer is the “primary beneficiary” in the relationship and suggesting factors relevant to
this analysis); cf. Dynamex Operations W., Inc. v. Superior Court, 416 P.3d 1, 7 (Cal. 2018)
(in considering the propriety of certifying a class of delivery drivers allegedly misclassified as
independent contractors in violation of a state wage order, California Supreme Court
suggested that the drivers may qualify as employees rather than independent contractors and
endorsed the three-part ABC test to determine whether the drivers were misclassified, with
Dynamex bearing the burden of proof on the issue).
6. See Cano v. DPNY, Inc., 287 F.R.D. 251, 260 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (plaintiff stated a
claim that franchisor and franchisee were joint employers for wage-hour purposes where
Domino’s Pizza required its franchisees to use a certain payroll system and to adopt
management, operation, hiring and inspection policies); see also Bonaventura v. Gear Fitness
One NY Plaza LLC, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53269, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2018) (“The
Second Circuit has not squarely addressed whether a franchisor of an independently owned
franchise may be the ‘employer’ of a franchise employee for purposes of FLSA liability” and
declaring that “[i]n the absence of clear guidance,” courts in that Circuit will rely on the
economic reality test to determine whether an employment relationship exists).
7. Baystate Alt. Staffing v. Herman, 163 F.3d 668, 676 (1st Cir. 1998) (holding staffing
corporation joint employer of temporary workers along with client companies who supervised
their work); cf. Salinas v. Commercial Interiors, Inc., 848 F.3d 125, 147–49 (4th Cir. 2017)
(general contractor and defunct subcontractor joint employers of drywall installers, where they
shared authority over and codetermined the key terms and conditions of the installers’
employment).
8. See, e.g., USDOL’s June 2017 decision to withdraw Administrator’s Interpretation
No. 2016-1, “Joint Employment Under the Fair Labor Standards Act and Migrant and
Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act” (Jan. 20, 2016). Michael J. Lotito and Ilyse
Schuman, DOL Withdraws Joint Employer and Independent Contractor Guidance, (June 7,
2017), https://www.littler.com/publication-press/publication/dol-withdraws-joint-employerand-independent-contractor-guidance; U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., US SECRETARY OF LABOR
WITHDRAWS JOINT EMPLOYMENT, INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR INFORMAL
GUIDANCE (June 7, 2017), https://www.dol.gov/newsroom/releases/opa/opa20170607. The
National Labor Relations Board retreated from its position that franchisors may be held to be
joint employers of their franchisee’s employees. See Hy-Brand Indus. Contractors, Ltd. v.
Brandt, 365 NLRB No. 156 (Dec. 14, 2017), 2017 NLRB LEXIS 635 (overruling the 2015
decision in Browning-Ferris Indus. of Cal. Inc., 362 NLRB No. 186 (Aug. 27, 2015), 2015
NLRB LEXIS 672, holding that franchisors and franchisees could be joint employers, and
returning to pre-Browning-Ferris joint employer standard that two or more entities may be
deemed joint employer under the NLRA if one entity exercises control over essential
employment terms of the other entity’s employees). However, the Hy-Brand decision was
vacated, and the Browning-Ferris decision reinstated as a result of a motion to reconsider
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straddle the line between independent contractors and employees without
reaping any of the benefits of employment and without sharing in the vast
majority of profits realized from the platforms under which they work.9
From a policy standpoint, contingent workers are in need of
protection. Not only are technology and market forces driving the growing
prevalence of “gig work,” but gig and other contingent workers are becoming
increasingly marginalized in what is already a grossly inequitable bargaining
relationship. These and other issues mandate that Congress and the courts
reconsider who is entitled to wage-hour and other protections.
Part I of this Article explores traditional definitions of employment
from the common law and the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) 20-Factor
Test to the Fair Labor Standards Act’s economic realities test and other
statutory definitions of the term. Part II examines expanding definitions of
who qualifies as an “employer,” with an emphasis on joint employment
relationships. Part III highlights new definitions of work that have emerged
in the literature and as a result of litigation over the status of contingent
workers in a gig economy, examines policy issues underlying worker
classification in the twenty-first century, and proposes solutions to protect a
growing contingent workforce while—at the same time—preserving the
flexibility and conveniences associated with gig work.
I.
EMPLOYEES VS. INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS: WHY IT
MATTERS AND CURRENT DEFINITIONS OF WORKERS AND WORK
A.

Consequences of Worker Classification

Whether a worker is classified as an “employee” or “independent
contractor” has profound consequences to employees and employers alike.
From the employee’s perspective, classification affects the following:
taxation; entitlement to unemployment compensation; Social Security and
Medicare benefits; eligibility for health insurance and other employerbased, in part, on Member Emanuel’s failure to recuse himself in the Hy-Brand case (his
former firm represented a party in Browning-Ferris). See Hy-Brand, 2018 NLRB LEXIS 103,
at *1–2. The Board’s reasoning in Browning-Ferris was recently endorsed by the D.C. Circuit.
See Browning-Ferris of Indus. of Cal., Inc. v. NLRB, 911 F.3d 1195, 1218 (D.C. Cir. 2018).
Despite this decision, the Board appears to be headed in the opposite direction. The new Board
Chairman (John Ring) and the Board issued notice that it was considering a definition of joint
employment through rule-making that mirrored the majority opinion and dissent in Hy-Brand.
Interested parties are to submit comments to the proposed rule on or before January 28, 2019.
See NAT’L LABOR RELATIONS BD., NLRB Further Extends Time for Submitting Comments on
Proposed Joint-Employer Rulemaking in Light of DC Circuit’s Recent Browning-Ferris
Decision (Jan. 11, 2019), https://www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/news-story/nlrb-furtherextends-time-submitting-comments-proposed-joint-employer-1.
9. Omri Ben-Shahar, Are Uber Drivers Employees: The Answer Will Shape the
Sharing Economy, FORBES (Nov. 15, 2017, 11:24 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/omrib
enshahar/2017/11/15/are-uber-drivers-employees-the-answer-will-shape-the-sharingeconomy/#45fb85bc5e55.
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provided benefits; and coverage under federal, state, and local labor and
employment laws, and state workers’ compensation statutes.10 These
coverages and benefits are generally unavailable to independent contractors11
who pay self-employment taxes and certain business expenses and who—at
least, in theory—have increased flexibility in their work and the ability to
realize profits from their labors.
From the employer’s perspective, businesses significantly reduce
their expenses and obligations by classifying workers as independent
contractors. Specifically, they avoid paying Federal Social Security,
Medicare, and payroll taxes, unemployment insurance taxes, and state
employment taxes by classifying workers as independent contractors rather
than as employees.12 Moreover, businesses are liable for their employees’
negligent acts committed during the course of and within the scope of
employment.13 Business also must comply with federal, state, and local laws
regulating the employment relationship and be certain of its terms and
conditions.14 No similar obligations generally attach when independent
contractors are hired instead of employees.
Under all of these circumstances, there is no question that businesses
realize substantial cost-savings, estimated at twenty-five to thirty percent, by
classifying their workers as independent contractors.15 Indeed, the only
downsides to such classification are that the business has less control over
the manner and means by which the work is accomplished where independent
contractors, as opposed to employees, perform the work, and there are

10. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF LAB.: WAGE-HOUR DIV. Misclassification of Employees
as Independent Contractors, https://www.dol.gov/whd/workers/misclassification (last visited
on Sept. 19, 2018).
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. See generally Peña v. Greffet, 110 F. Supp. 3d 1103, 1114–15 (D.N.M. 2015);
Walgreen Co. v. Hinchy, 21 N.E.3d 99, 107 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (citing Restatement (Third)
Agency § 7.07(1)); Valles v. Albert Einstein Med. Ctr., 758 A.2d 1238, 1244 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2000); see also Valentine v. Hodnett, No. 5:14-CV-72, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 188205, at
**22-23 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 16, 2015) (to hold an employer vicariously liable for the acts of an
employee, a plaintiff must prove that the employee caused harm while acting within the scope
of his or her general authority and in furtherance of the employer’s business and objectives).
14. See, e.g., FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, 563 F.3d 492, 505 (D.C. Cir. 2009)
(employees, not independent contractors, enjoy collective bargaining rights under the National
Labor Relations Act, which expressly excludes independent contractors from its definition of
“employee” at 29 U.S.C. § 152(3)); Schwieger v. Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 207 F.3d 480, 483
(8th Cir. 2000) (employees and not independent contractors are covered by Title VII);
Alexander v. Rush N. Shore Med. Ctr., 101 F.3d 487, 494 (7th Cir. 1996) (physician – who
was an independent contractor – could not maintain a Title VII action against hospital where
he had privileges).
15. Paula M. Singer & Laura Francisco, Benefits of Compensating Independent
Contractors vs. Employees, ALA-APA: LIBRARY WORKLIFE: HR E-NEWS FOR TODAY’S
LEADERS (May 17, 2005), http://ala-apa.org/newsletter/2005/05/17/benefits-of-compensatingindependent-contractors-vs-employees/.
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significant potential costs and penalties associated with misclassifying
employees as independent contractors.16
The government, too, has a stake in worker classification. According
to the IRS, worker misclassification results in billions of dollars in lost
revenues.17 Similar dollars are lost on the state and local levels as a result of
worker misclassification.18
B.

Statutory Definitions of Employment

Coverage under federal, state, and local labor and employment laws
typically depends on employee status. Given the pivotal nature of this
determination, it is surprising that the labor and employment statutes provide
little guidance on who is an employee. For example, Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 defines an “employee” as “an individual employed by an
employer,” subject to certain exceptions.19 Title VII’s definition of
“employer” is also circular, focusing on the number of employees (fifteen or
more) “for each working day in each of the twenty or more calendar weeks
in the current or preceding calendar year” and on whether the putative
employer is engaged in an industry affecting commerce.20 Neither definition
discusses the nature of the work performed.
Similar issues surrounding the statutory definitions of “employee”
and “employer” may be found in the Employee Retirement Income Security

16. For example, in O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 201 F. Supp. 3d 1110 (N.D. Cal.
2016), in the proposed settlement agreement, Uber agreed to pay $84 million, plus an
additional $16 million contingent on an initial public offering (IPO) reaching one-and-a-half
times Uber’s most recent valuation. Id. at 1117, Declaration of Shannon Liss-Riordan In
Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement, Exh. 6 at
13, 21. The class in O’Connor consisted of 385,000 California and Massachusetts drivers. The
district court declined to approve the settlement agreement as “not fair, adequate and
reasonable.” O’Connor, 201 F. Supp. 3d at 1135. Under California law, Cal. Lab. Code
§ 226.8, it is unlawful to misclassify workers as independent contractors.
17. See David Bauer, The Misclassification of Independent Contractors: The Fifty-Four
Billion Dollar Problem, 12 RUTGERS J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 138, 144–45 & n.35 (2015); Michael
Phillips, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREAS., Ref. No. 2009-30-035, While Actions Have Been Taken
to Address Worker Misclassification, an Agency-Wide Employment Tax Program and Better
Data Are Needed 8 (2009). According to a 2009 report, the IRS estimated that worker
misclassification costs the IRS approximately “$54 billion per year in underreported
employment tax, including losses of $ 15 billion in unpaid FICA and UI taxes.” Id. at 8. The
Internal Revenue Service (IRS), U.S. Department of Labor (USDOL), and state governments
have increasingly concentrated their efforts to correct worker misclassification. As of October
2017, 37 states have formed partnerships with the USDOL to share and coordinate
enforcement of worker misclassification. A sample agreement between the USDOL and the
Alabama Department of Labor appears on the USDOL website at https://www.dol.gov/whd/
workers/Misclassification/al1.htm.
18. Bauer, supra note 17, at 144.
19. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (2018).
20. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2018).
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Act (“ERISA”),21 the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”),22
and the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”).23 Accordingly, the real task of
identifying employment relationships and defining their characteristics has
been left to the courts.
Court decisions have been inconsistent at best, based on the
overlapping tests used to determine employment status and an ever-changing
list of factors deemed relevant to this analysis. Although courts tend to define
employment more broadly when the statute has a remedial purpose, like the
ADEA,24 they most often rely on the common law test—and not on the
underlying statutory purpose—in determining whether an individual is an
employee or independent contractor.25
C.

The Traditional Common Law Agency Test

The common law definition of “employee” appears simplistic but
produces varied results. Its focus is on “the hiring party’s right to control the
manner and means by which the work is accomplished.”26 Courts have
articulated several factors, in addition to the right to control, weighing in on
this analysis, including: (1) the skill required to do the job; (2) the source of
the instrumentalities and tools; (3) the location of the work; (4) the duration
of the relationship between the parties; (5) whether the hiring party has the
right to assign additional projects to the hired party; (6) the extent of the hired
party’s discretion over when and how long to work; (7) the method of
payment; (8) the hired party’s role in hiring and paying assistants; (9)
whether the work is part of the regular business of the hiring party; (10)
whether the hiring party is in business; (11) the provision of employee
benefits; and (12) the tax treatment of the hired party. 27
None of the foregoing factors is dispositive, and the list of factors is
non-exhaustive. 28 Maximization of the right to control tends to militate in
favor of employee status. The common law test applies to determine who
21. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(6) (2018) (defining “employee” as “any individual employed by
an employer”).
22. 29 U.S.C. § 630(f) (2018) (defining “employee” as “an individual employed by any
employer,” excepting certain elected officials, their personal staff, immediate advisors and
those on a policymaking level).
23. 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1) (2018). The FLSA’s economic realities test used to determine
employment status under that Act is discussed at notes 37–51 and accompanying text infra.
24. See Lilley v. BTM Corp., 958 F.2d 746, 750 (6th Cir. 1992) (“The term ‘employee’
is to be given a broad construction in order to effectuate the remedial purposes of the ADEA”).
25. Id.; see also Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 322–23 (1992)
(applying common law test to ERISA and endorsing the use of that test to determine
employment status whenever a federal statutory definition of “employee” is less than helpful).
26. See Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751–52 (1989).
27. Id. (often referenced as the “Reid factors”); see also Darden, 503 U.S. at 322–23
(applying the Reid factors to determine whether the terminated plaintiff qualified as an
“employee” for purposes of ERISA coverage).
28. Reid, 490 U.S. at 751–52.
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qualifies as an “employee” under federal statutes that fail to provide a
meaningful definition of that term.29
D.

The IRS 20-Factor Test: A Variation of the Common Law Test

The IRS has adopted a variation of the common law right-to-control
test to determine whether a worker is an independent contractor or employee.
30
This test identifies the following twenty factors as helpful in determining
whether an employment relationship exists:
1.
Control – If the worker “is subject to the will and
control of the employer not only as to what shall be done but
how it shall be done,” the worker is an employee.31
2.
Right to hire, fire, supervise, and pay assistants –
Such actions suggest independent contractor status.
3.
Training – Employer-provided training and
mandatory attendance at meetings suggests an employment
relationship.
4.
Set work hours – Independent contractors set their
own hours.
5.
Integration – Where the worker’s services are an
integral part of the hiring party’s operations, it is more likely
that the worker is an employee.
6.
Work schedule – Independent contractors set their
own work schedules.
7.
Services performed by worker – Independent
contractors maintain flexibility in who will perform the
work.
8.
Permanency or duration of the relationship –
Longevity or permanency in the relationship suggests
employment status; by contrast, independent contractors
tend to be hired on a project basis or for a set duration.

29. Darden, 503 U.S. at 318.
30. Rev. Rul. 87-41, 1987-1 C.B. 296.
31. 26 C.F.R. § 31.3401(c)–1(b).
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9.
Sequence of work – Independent contractors
typically are free to determine how and in what order tasks
will be performed.
10.
Location of services – While not determinative,
particularly with the marked increase in virtual and gig
work, employees are usually required to perform work on
the employer’s premises.
11.
tools.

Tools – Independent contractors supply their own

12.
Reports – Where the worker is required to submit
periodic reports, an employment relationship is suggested.
Where independent contractors are required to submit
reports, it is typically based on contractual benchmarks for
the completion of a project.
13.
Investment – Investment in the work facilities or a
particular project suggests independent contractor status.
14.
Remuneration and withholding – Employees tend to
be paid on an hourly or salaried basis subject to withholding,
in contrast to independent contractors who tend to be paid
by the project or job. Independent contractors pay selfemployment taxes and are not subject to withholding.
15.
Job-related expenses – Independent contractors pay
their own business and travel expenses (although some of
their expenses may be invoiced pursuant to the parties’
contract), in contrast to employees, who are typically
reimbursed for their expenses.
16.
Termination – Most employees can be terminated at
will without the employer incurring liability. The work of
independent contractors typically ends when a project ends
or the contract expires.
17.
Ability to incur profit and loss – An independent
contractor has the ability to realize profit or loss on the job.
This should be distinguished from employee bonuses which
may be linked to company sales or profits.
18.
Full-time employment – Independent contractors
are not hired on a full-time basis.
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19.
Right to work for multiple persons or entities –
Independent contractors typically work for more than one
person or entity.
20.
Services offered to the public – Independent
contractors generally hold themselves out for hire to the
public or to other contractors within a particular trade.32
The IRS streamlined this test in 2004, dividing the factors relevant
to employment status into three categories based on (1) “behavioral
control,”33 (2) “financial control,”34 and (3) the relationship of the parties.35
Together, these categories and their factors focus on the totality of the
relationship to determine whether a worker is an independent contractor or
employee.36
E.

The Statutory or Primary Purpose Test

The statutory or primary purpose test focuses on the purpose of the
underlying statute and its application instead of examining the indicia of the
parties’ relationship. The test has its origins in the United States Supreme
Court decision in NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc.,37 in which the Court
held that “newsboys” were employees within the meaning of the National
Labor Relations Act’s (“NLRA”) definition of “employee.”38 The Court
32. Rev. Rul. 87-41, 1987-1 C.B. 296.
33. IRS, Behavioral Control, https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-selfemployed/behavioral-control (last visited on Sept. 18, 2018). Behavioral control focuses on
whether the hiring party has the right to control how the hired party works and considers: the
type of instructions and degree of instruction given in connection with the work to be
performed; evaluation systems utilized; and the training provided. Id.
34. IRS, Financial Control, https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-selfemployed/financial-control (last visited on Sept. 18, 2018). “Financial control” refers to facts
determinative of whether the business has the right to control “the economic aspects of the
worker’s job” and encompasses the following factors: whether the hired party makes a
significant investment in the company; whether the hired party has an opportunity for profit
and loss; the method of payment for work performed; whether the worker’s services are
available to the market; and whether the hired party incurs unreimbursed expenses. Id.
35. IRS, Type of Relationship, https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-selfemployed/type-of-relationship (last visited on Sept. 18, 2018). The “type of relationship”
category focuses on how the worker and business perceive their relationship to each other.
Factors relevant to this determination include: the existence of a written contract; the provision
of employee benefits; whether the services provided are key to the business’ activity; and the
permanency of the parties’ relationship. Id.
36. See IRS, Independent Contractor (Self-Employed) or Employee?, https://www.irs.
gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-employed/independent-contractor-self-employed-oremployee (last visitedupdated Apr. 23, 2018).
37. 322 U.S. 111 (1944).
38. Id. at 131. “Newsboys” referred to adult men who sold newspapers to customers on
the city streets at established locations on a full-time basis, often for a number of years without
turnover. The defendant publishers refused to bargain with them, on the basis that they were
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rejected the notion that Congress intended to apply the common law agency
test to the NLRA’s definition of “employee” and instead looked to the
economic reality of the relationship and the special purposes of the Act to
reach its conclusion.39 The Court explained its reasoning as follows:
Whether, given the intended national uniformity, the term
‘employee’ includes such workers as these newsboys must
be answered primarily from the history, terms and purposes
of the legislation. The word “is not treated by Congress as a
word of art having a definite meaning. . . .” Rather, “it takes
color from its surroundings [in] the statute where it appears,”
and derives meaning from the context of that statute, which
“must be read in light of the mischief to be corrected and the
end to be attained.”40
Congress subsequently amended the NLRA to expressly exclude
independent contractors from the statutory definition of “employee,”41 and
the Supreme Court issued its decision in Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co.
v. Darden,42 endorsing the common law agency test as the benchmark to
determine employment status when a federal statute offers little guidance on
the issue.43 Since Darden, courts have abandoned the statutory or primary
purpose test as a vehicle to determine whether an individual is an employee
or independent contractor for coverage purposes.44
F.

The Fair Labor Standards Act’s Economic Realities Test

The FLSA provides that, subject to certain exceptions, the term
“employee” means “any individual employed by an employer.”45 Excepted
from the definition are volunteers, the personal staff of elected officials,
ministerial and cleric employees, and military commissary employees.46 An
independent contractors over whom the publishers exercised only incidental control. The
NLRB concluded that the newsboys were employees but, on appeal, the Ninth Circuit reached
the opposite conclusion.
39. Id. at 120, 129.
40. Id. at 124 (internal citations omitted).
41. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2018).
42. 503 U.S. 318 (1992).
43. Id. at 322–23.
44. However, courts have considered a statute’s purpose in other coverage contexts. See,
e.g., Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1997) (Supreme Court considered statutory
purpose in deciding to extend Title VII’s anti-retaliation protection of “employees and
applicants for employment” to former employee who allegedly received a negative reference
after he filed an EEOC charge); Hall v. DIRECTV, LLC, 846 F.3d 757, 768 (4th Cir. 2017)
(“Focusing first on the relationship between putative joint employers is essential to
accomplishing the FLSA’s ‘remedial and humanitarian’ purpose.”) (internal citations and
quotations omitted).
45. 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1) (2018).
46. 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(2)(A)(i) (2018).
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“employer” is likewise defined by the Act as “any person acting directly or
indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee.”47 These
circular definitions are of little help in defining “work” for FLSA coverage
purposes. The statutory definition of “employ,” which is “to suffer or permit
to work,”48 is too broad to be of much assistance, encompassing employees
as well as independent contractors within its reach. Courts interpreting the
FLSA have devised an “economic realities test” to determine whether a
worker is an employee within the meaning of that Act.49
The economic realities test is broader than the common law test used
to distinguish employees from independent contractors. To determine
whether an individual is an “employee” under the FLSA, courts look to the
economic reality of the business relationship as a whole.50 How the parties
label the relationship is of little consequence.51 Instead, courts adopt a
totality of the circumstances test in which a number of factors are analyzed
with the focus on whether the worker is economically dependent on the hiring
party or is in business for him or herself.52 Depending on the court, a four-,
five- or six-factor economic realities test may apply.53 These factors may
include:
(1) the degree of control exercised by the alleged employer
over the workers; (2) the worker’s opportunity for profit or
loss and investment in the business; (3) the degree of skill
47. 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (2018).
48. 29 U.S.C. § 203(g) (2018).
49. See Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 726–27 (1947) (affirming
the lower court’s decision that the common law test did not apply to the FLSA because “the
Act concerns itself with the correction of economic evils through remedies which were
unknown at common law . . . [and] the underlying economic realities . . . lead to the
conclusion that the [plaintiffs] were and are employees of [the defendant].”). The Supreme
Court first articulated the economic realities test in Rutherford. Decades later, the Court
expressly adopted the test for FLSA cases in Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Labor,
471 U.S. 290, 301 (1985).
50. Alamo Found., 471 U.S. at 301.
51. See Scantland v. Jeffry Knight, Inc., 721 F.3d 1308, 1311 (11th Cir. 2013) (“This
inquiry is not governed by the ‘label’ put on the relationship by the parties or the contract
controlling that relationship. . . .”).
52. See Hopkins v. Cornerstone Am., 545 F.3d 338, 342 (5th Cir. 2008), cert. denied,
556 U.S. 1129 (2009); Baker v. Flint Eng’g & Constr. Co., 137 F.3d 1436, 1440 (10th Cir.
1998); Brock v. Superior Care, Inc., 840 F.2d 1054, 1059 (2d Cir. 1988).
53. See, e.g., Saleem v. Corp. Transp. Grp., Ltd., 854 F.3d 131, 139 n. 19 (2d Cir. 2017)
(adopting the five-factor test of United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704, 713 (1947)); Keller v. Miri
Microsystems LLC, 781 F.3d 799, 807–12 (6th Cir. 2015) (six-factor test); Scantland, 721
F.3d at 1311–12 (six-factor test); Martin v. Spring Break ‘83 Prods., LLC, 688 F.3d 247, 251
(5th Cir. 2012) (four-factor test); Hopkins, 545 F.3d at 343 (five-factor test); Zheng v. Liberty
Apparel Co., 355 F.3d 61, 75 (2d Cir. 2003) (six-factor test focusing on “functional control”);
Morrison v. Int’l Programs Consortium, Inc., 253 F.3d 5, 10 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (four-factor
test); Donovan v. Dialamerica Mktg., Inc., 757 F.2d 1376, 1381 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
474 U.S. 919 (1985) (six-factor test); Donovan v. Brandel, 736 F.2d 1114, 1117 (6th Cir.
1984) (six-factor test).
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and independent initiative required to perform the work; (4)
the permanency or duration of the relationship; and (5) the
extent to which the work is an integral part of the employer’s
business.54
While the courts differ on the factors and their emphasis, they agree
that the factors are non-exhaustive and that no single factor is
determinative.55 “Rather, each factor is a tool used to gauge the economic
dependence of the alleged employee and each must be applied with this
ultimate concept in mind.”56 Stated differently, the ultimate question is
whether workers are employees “as a matter of economic reality . . .
dependent upon the business to which they render service.”57 Where an
individual is able to work for competing companies, he or she is considered
to be less economically dependent on the putative employer.58 While this
relinquishment of control is not dispositive, it weighs in favor of independent
contractor status.59
G.

Hybrid Test: Combining the Common Law and Economic
Realities Tests

The hybrid test is a combination of the common law and economic
reality tests, with an emphasis on the right-to-control factor.60 Generally, the
54. Alamo Found., 471 U.S. at 301; Zheng, 355 F.3d at 67.
55. See, e.g., Thibault v. BellSouth Telcoms., Inc., 612 F.3d 843, 848–50 (5th Cir. 2010)
(splicer hired to repair telecommunications grid after a hurricane was an independent
contractor and not an employee of the telephone company, its contractor or subcontractor,
despite the fact that the splicer performed hourly work that was subject to daily assignment,
where splicer did not work exclusively for defendants, provided his own materials and
equipment and determined how his work was to be performed); Gustafson v. Bell Atl. Corp.,
171 F. Supp. 2d 311, 321 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (chauffeur for one of defendant’s executives was
technically an independent contractor, but qualified for FLSA coverage because the defendant
exercised complete control over his on-the-job activities). See generally Scantland, 721 F.3d
at 1312.
56. Hopkins, 545 F.3d at 343.
57. Bartels v. Birmingham, 332 U.S. 126, 130 (1947); Saleem, 854 F.3d at 141–46;
Martin v. Selker Bros., Inc., 949 F.2d 1286, 1293 (3d Cir. 1991).
58. See Saleem v. Corp. Transp. Grp., 854 F.3d 131, 141–42 (2d Cir. 2017), (the fact
that “black-car” drivers, who owned or operated “black-car” franchises, “could (and did) work
for [defendant’s] business rivals and transport personal clients while simultaneously
maintaining their franchises without consequence” suggested that drivers were independent
contractors); Keller, 781 F.3d at 807 (“If a worker has multiple jobs for different companies,
then that weighs in favor of finding that the worker is an independent contractor.”).
59. Saleem, 854 F.3d at 141–42; see also Thibault, 612 F.3d at 846–847; Carrell v.
Sunland Constr., Inc., 998 F.2d 330, 334 (5th Cir. 1993); Bates v. Bell Tel. Co., 1993 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 21507, at *7 (E.D. Pa. July 13, 1993), aff’d 22 F. 3d 300 (3d Cir. 1994).
60. See Butler v. Drive Auto. Indus. of Am., 793 F.3d 404, 414 (4th Cir. 2015) (noting
the court’s application of the hybrid test to determine employee status in Title VII cases and
adopting it in a joint employment context but modifying the relevant factors to “adequately
capture the unique circumstances of joint employment”); Hathcock v. Acme Truck Lines, Inc.,
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right-to-control component of the test focuses on who hires and fires,
supervises, and sets work schedules. If that control lies with the worker, the
relationship will be considered an independent contractor relationship. The
economic realities component of the test, by contrast, focuses on how the
worker is paid, whether his or her payments are subject to withholdings,
whether the worker is eligible for employee benefits, and whether the worker
works for the hiring party exclusively or has other clients and customers.61
The hybrid test is most commonly, but not exclusively, applied to
determine employee status for Title VII coverage purposes.62 This
application is questionable, however, in light of Supreme Court precedent
suggesting that the common law agency test63 applies to determine employee
status in Title VII cases.
H.

The ABC Test: Simplifying the Analysis

The final standard used to determine employee status is commonly
referred to as the ABC test.64 This test presumes that a worker is hired as an
employee and places the burden on the hiring party to establish that the
worker is an independent contractor by proof of each of the following factors:
(a) that the worker is free from control and direction over
performance of the work, both under the contract and in fact;
(b) that the worker performs work that is outside the usual
course of hiring entity’s business; and (c) that the worker is
customarily engaged in an independently established trade,
occupation or business of the same nature as the work
performed for the hiring entity.65

262 F.3d 522, 526 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 928 (2002) (employee status in Title
VII case); Deal v. State Farm Cty. Mut. Ins. Co., 5 F.3d 117, 118–19 (5th Cir. 1993) (employee
status in Title VII and ADEA case).
61. Deal, 5 F.3d at 118–19.
62. See, e.g., Muhammad v. Dall. Cty. Cmty. Supervision & Corr. Dep’t, 479 F.3d 377,
380 (5th Cir. 2007) (“To determine whether an employment relationship exists within the
meaning of Title VII, we apply a hybrid economic realities/common law control test.”)
(internal citation and quotation omitted); EEOC v. Zippo Mfg., Co., 713 F.2d 32, 37 (3d. Cir.
1983) (mentioning the use of hybrid test for Title VII cases); see also Hill v. City of Austin
Pub. Works, A-08-CV-079 LY, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21434, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 19,
2008) (utilizing the hybrid test to find that workers were not employees of plaintiffemployer); D’Annunzio v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 927 A.2d 113, 121 (N.J.
2007) (utilizing hybrid test under the state whistleblower statute).
63. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 318 (1992) (an ERISA case in
which the Court applied the common law test but stated, in dicta, that the common law test
applies to determine who qualifies as an “employee” in federal statutes, like Title VII, that do
not otherwise provide a meaningful definition of the term); Walters v. Metro. Educ. Enters.,
Inc., 519 U.S. 202, 211–12 (1997) (suggesting common law test applied in Title VII case).
64. See Dynamex Operations W., Inc. v. Superior Court., 416 P.3d 1, 48–50 (Cal. 2018).
65. See id.
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The appropriate inquiry under Part (c) of the test “is whether the
person engaged in covered employment actually has an independent
business, occupation, or profession of the same nature as the work to be
performed, not whether he or she could have one.”66 Where the hiring party
fails to establish each of these elements, the worker is deemed to be an
employee and not an independent contractor.67
II.
A.

THE EVOLUTION OF JOINT EMPLOYMENT DOCTRINE AND ITS
EFFECT ON “EMPLOYEE” STATUS
Statutory Definitions of “Employer”

Labor and employment statutes offer little guidance on the question
of who an employer is, despite the fact that employer status determines
coverage under all of these statutes. Statutory definitions of employers are
elusive, at best.
Title VII, for example, only applies to businesses that employ fifteen
or more employees for at least twenty weeks in a relevant calendar year.68
Other employment statutes similarly define employers based on the number
of persons employed.69 Given these definitions, it is not surprising that
determinations of employer status often hinge on whether certain persons—
most notably, partners, shareholders, and directors70—should be counted as
employees able to satisfy the employee minimum for coverage or whether
they are, in essence, “employers” and thereby excluded from coverage. In
making this determination, courts look to “the common-law element of
66. Accord JSF Promotions, Inc. v. Adm’r, 828 A.2d 609, 614 (Conn. 2003) (fact that
the hiring party permits a worker to engage in similar activities for other businesses is
insufficient to satisfy part C of the test; worker must be “customarily engaged in an
independently established trade, occupation, profession or business” to satisfy part C of the
standard); see McGuire v. Dep’t of Emp’t. Sec., 768 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
67. McGuire, 768 P.2d at 987; see, e.g., Fleece on Earth v. Dep’t of Emp’t & Training,
923 A.2d 594, 599–600 (Vt. 2007) (work-at-home knitters and sewers who made clothing sold
by plaintiff children’s wear company were employees; company that designed all of the
clothing and provided all patterns and yarn to the homeworkers could not satisfy part A of the
ABC test, despite the facts that workers used their own machines and worked at their own
pace and on days and at times of their choosing); see generally Deknatel & Hoff-Downing,
ABC on the Books and in the Courts: An Analysis of Recent Independent Contractor and
Misclassification Statutes, 18 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 53 (2015).
68. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2018).
69. The Americans with Disabilities Act’s (“ADA”) definition of “employer” is
identical to Title VII’s definition except it raises the employee minimum to 25. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 1211(5)(A) (2018). The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) increases the
minimum employee threshold to twenty (20 U.S.C. § 630(b) (2018)), while the Employment
Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”) raises the minimum to fifty (50) and imposes
some additional requirements (29 U.S.C. § 1002(5) (2018)).
70. See, e.g., Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 449–
50 (2003) (whether shareholders and directors of a professional corporation should be counted
as “employees” or “employers” under Title VII).
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control,” specifically, whether the individual acts independently and
participates in managing the organization or whether the individual is subject
to the organization’s control.”71
Unlike Title VII, the FLSA does not consider employee numbers as
a benchmark for employer status. Instead, the FLSA defines an “employer”
as “any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in
relation to an employee,”72 and an “employee” as “any individual employed
by an employer.”73 Again, these definitions add little to the analysis which
has been left to the courts.
B.

Judicial Approaches to Defining Employers

Courts often assume, without deciding, that a particular entity is an
“employer.” They are typically asked to determine “employer” status in two
contexts: (1) in deciding whether a particular entity or person qualifies as an
“employer” or “employee” for purposes of satisfying the employee threshold
for coverage74 (i.e., only employees may be counted for coverage purposes);
and (2) in deciding whether two or more entities or persons are considered to
be a joint employer, jointly and severally liable for statutory violations of
labor and employment laws.75
There are essentially two approaches to determine who qualifies as
the employer in the usual case. The first approach involves a two-step
process: (1) determining whether the person or entity falls within the
statutory definition of employer; and (2) determining whether an
employment relationship exists between the parties, under a hybrid economic

71. See generally id. at 449, quoting EEOC Compliance Man. § 605:0009 (2000).
Clackamas further adopted a six-factor test to determine whether partners, officers, directors
and shareholders constitute employees of the organization, including: (1) whether the
organization could hire or fire the individual or set the rules and regulations of the individual’s
work; (2) whether and, if so, to what extent the organization supervised the individual’s work;
(3) whether the individual reported to someone higher in the organization; (4) whether and, if
so, to what extent the individual was able to influence the organization; (5) whether the parties
intended that the individual be an employee, as expressed in written agreements or contracts;
and (6) whether the individual shared in the profits, losses, and liabilities of the organization.
Id. at 449–50, (quoting EEOC Compliance Man. § 605:0009).
72. 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(2)(A)(i) (2018).
73. 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1) (2018).
74. Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 449–50 (whether shareholders and directors of a
professional corporation should be counted as “employees” or “employers” under Title VII).
75. See, e.g., Chao v. A-One Med. Servs., Inc., 346 F.3d 908, 917–18 (9th Cir. 2003);
Torres-Lopez v. May, 111 F.3d 633, 639 (9th Cir, 1997); Chao v. Barbeque Ventures, LLC,
No. 8:06CV676, 2007 WL 5971772, at *1, *6 (Neb. Dec. 12, 2007).
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realities test.76 Under the second approach, courts apply traditional common
law or economic reality tests to determine employer status.77
C.

Joint Employment Theory or Doctrine

In the joint employment scenario, each employer has control over the
employees, in contrast to the single employer situation in which two separate
entities are considered as one.78 The single employer doctrine is most often
invoked by unions in a traditional labor law context to assert coverage over
collectively bargained-for work79 and to prevent an employer from creating
or abusing a double-breasted operation to shift work from a unionized jobsite
to a non-unionized environment to avoid paying wages and benefits under
the applicable bargaining agreement.80 When applied in a non-labor setting,
the single employer doctrine may be invoked to determine whether a parent
and subsidiary company constitute a single employer.81 Both the NLRB and
the courts apply a multi-factor totality of the circumstances test to decide
questions of single employer status, with particular emphasis on whether the
two entities share centralized control over labor relations.82
The single employer doctrine is sometimes confused with joint
employment theory. While the single employer doctrine has little relevance
to the protection of contingent workers or to the characterization of
contingent or gig work, the opposite is true of joint employment. Joint
employment theory generally provides that two entities or persons may be
held jointly and severally liable for statutory or common law employment
violations where the two entities or persons “share or co-determine those
matters involving the essential terms and conditions of employment.”83
76. See Johnson v. Manpower Prof’l Servs., Inc., No. 11-20199, 2011 WL 4584757, at
*4 (5th Cir. Oct. 5, 2011) (applying same hybrid test in the Title VII and §1981 case); Deal v.
State Farm Cty. Mut. Ins. Co., 5 F.3d 117, 118–19 (5th Cir. 1993) (employee status in Title
VII and ADEA case).
77. See, e.g., Hale v. Arizona, 993 F. 2d 1387, 1394 (9th Cir. 1993) (FLSA applying
economic realities test).
78. See Butler v. Drive Auto Indus. of Am., 793 F.3d 404, 407–09 & n.3 (4th Cir. 2015);
NLRB v. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc., 691 F.2d 1117, 1122 (3d Cir. 1982).
79. See, e.g., Commc’n Workers of Am. v. U.S. W. Direct, 847 F.2d 1475, 1477–78
(10th Cir. 1988).
80. See S. Cal. Painters & Allied Trades v. Rodin & Co., 558 F.3d 1028, 1031 (9th Cir.
2009).
81. Cook v. Arrowsmith Shelburne, Inc., 69 F.3d 1235, 1241 (2d Cir. 1995).
82. See Radio & Television Broad. Technicians Local Union v. Broad. Serv. of Mobile,
Inc., 380 U.S. 255, 256 (1965); Point Am. Servs., Inc., 353 NLRB 973 (Feb. 25, 2009), at 1,
2009 NLRB LEXIS 49; Dow Chem. Co., 326 NLRB 288 (1988), at 288. Courts consider the
totality of circumstances and evaluate four factors in deciding single employer status: (1)
whether operations are interrelated, (2) whether common management exists; (3) whether the
parties have common ownership of financial control; and (4) where the two entities have share
centralized control over labor relations. The fourth factor often emerges as the most important
one. Radio & Television Broad. Technicians, 380 U.S. at 256.
83. Graves v. Lowery, 117 F.3d 723, 727 (3d Cir. 1997).
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Stated differently, “courts look to whether both entities exercise sufficient
control over the same employees” so that each may be considered an
employer.84
In practice, the joint employment doctrine may prevent an entity that
effectively employs workers from shifting its employment obligations and
any related liabilities to a second entity.85 Thus, it has the potential to extend
employment protections to gig and other contingent workers depending on
the joint employment theory applied. As the Fourth Circuit has recognized,
“the joint employment doctrine . . . recognizes the reality of changes in
modern employment, in which increasing numbers of [contingent] workers
are employed by temporary staffing companies that exercise little control
over their day-to-day activities.”86
There are, in fact, several versions of the joint employment doctrine.
Both the NLRB and the United States Department of Labor have expanded
and contracted their definitions of “joint employment” over the last five
years.87 The NLRB’s shift in position has generally revolved whether a
putative employer must exert direct and significant control over the essential
terms and conditions of employment in order to be held jointly liable or
whether “indirect control” or the “reserved authority” to exercise control is
sufficient for a finding of joint employment.88 The Department of Labor’s
shift in position occurred with the adoption and later withdrawal of
Administrator’s Interpretation 2016-1, originally issued in January 2016,
which established new and expansive standards for determining joint
employment under the FLSA and the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural
Worker Protection Act.89
The courts also have applied different standards in deciding whether,
and to what extent, joint employment exists in a particular case. Historically,
courts have used the economic realities test, the common law control test, or
the hybrid test to determine in a fact-specific way whether joint employment
84. See Bristol v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 312 F.3d 1214, 1218–19 (10th Cir. 2002) (en
banc) (quoting Virgo v. Rivera Beach Assocs., Ltd., 30 F.3d 1350, 1360 (11th Cir. 1994)).
85. Butler v. Drive Auto Indus. of Am., 793 F.3d 404, 410 (4th Cir. 2015); Sibley Mem’l
Hosp. v. Wilson, 488 F.2d 1338, 1341 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
86. Butler, 793 F.3d at 410.
87. Celine McNicholas & Marni von Wilpert, The joint employer standard and the
National Labor Relations Board, ECON. POL’Y INST. (May 31, 2017), https://www.epi.org/p
ublication/the-joint-employer-standard-and-the-national-labor-relations-board-what-is-atstake-for-workers/.
88. Compare Browning-Ferris Indus. of Cal., Inc., 362 NLRB No.186 (Aug. 27, 2015)
with Hy-Brand Indus. Contractors, Ltd. v. Brandt, 365 NLRB No. 156 (Dec. 14, 2017), 2017
NLRB LEXIS 635, vacated on other grounds, 2018 NLRB LEXIS 103 (Feb. 26, 2018). The
Hy-Brand standard is now the subject of proposed rule-making notwithstanding a D.C. Circuit
opinion endorsing the NLRB’s decision in Browning-Ferris. See Browning-Ferris Indus. of
Cal., Inc. v. NLRB, 911 F.3d 1195, 1218 (D.C. Cir. 2018); see also supra note 8 and accomp
anying text.
89. See USDOL, Wage & Hour Div, Adm’rs Inter. No. 26-1, “Joint Employment Under
the Fair Labor Standards Act and Migrant Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act”, 2016
WL 284582 (Jan. 20, 2016).
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exists.90 While these tests are essentially the same tests used to determine
employee status, the factors are modified when the inquiry relates to joint
employment. To add even more confusion, the factors change with the
various circuits.
In Bonnette v. California Health & Welfare Agency, the Ninth Circuit
applied the joint employment theory to determine that “chore workers” hired
to provide domestic services by public aid recipients were employees of the
state welfare agencies that offered the welfare program.91 The court reasoned
that the agencies were employers as a matter of economic reality based on
the “considerable control” they exercised over the plaintiffs’ daily work.92
The court also identified four factors as relevant to the determination of joint
employment: “whether the alleged employer (1) had the power to hire and
fire employees; (2) supervised and controlled work schedules or conditions
of employment; (3) determined the rate and method of [the worker’s]
payment; and (4) maintained employment records.”93
While several courts have adopted the Bonnette factors in joint
employment cases, other courts have sharply criticized them or rejected a
factor-based approach altogether.94 Some of the criticisms have been
directed to Bonnette’s focus on the degree to which the putative employer
exercised direct control over the employee’s daily work and activities.95
Most recently, the Fourth Circuit adopted a new joint employment
test in Salinas v. Commercial Interiors, Inc.96 In Salinas, the court rejected
the Bonnette approach, which focused on the relationship between the
employee and the putative joint employer, in favor of a new test focused “on
the relationship between the putative joint employers.”97 Under the latter

90. See Faush v. Tuesday Morning, Inc., 808 F.3d 208, 214–16 (3d Cir. 2015) (applying
the common law test with the Reid factors); Burton v. Freescale Semiconductor, Inc., 798 F.3d
222, 227 (5th Cir. 2015) (applying a hybrid common law/economic realities test); Love v. JP
Cullen & Sons, Inc., 779 F.3d 697, 702–06 (7th Cir. 2015) (applying a five-factor economic
realities test).
91. 704 F.2d 1465, 1470 (9th Cir. 1983).
92. Id. at 1470.
93. Id.
94. See, e.g., Baystate Alt. Staffing v. Herman, 163 F.3d 668, 675 (1st Cir. 1998); Carter
v. Dutchess Cmty. Coll., 735 F.2d 8, 12 (2d Cir. 1984); see also Zheng v. Liberty Apparel
Co., 355 F.3d 61, 69 (2d Cir. 2003) (criticizing Bonnette as focused too narrowly on the
employer’s right to control and adding six factors to the Bonnette four- factor test). The
additional Zheng factors include: whether the putative joint employer’s premises and
equipment were used for the work; and whether responsibility under the contract with the
putative joint employer passed “without material changes” from one group of potential joint
employees to another. Id. at 72.
95. See, e.g., Moldenhauer v. Tazewell Pekin Consol. Commc’ns Ctr., 536 F.3d 640,
644 (7th Cir. 2008) (rejecting a factor-based approach to joint employment); see also Zheng,
355 F.3d at 69.
96. 848 F.3d 125 (4th Cir. 2017).
97. Id. at 141.
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test, joint employment exists if the two entities “are not completely
disassociated with respect to the worker.”98
The Salinas court also identified the following “non-exhaustive”
factors as relevant to a joint employment inquiry:
(1) Whether, formally or as a matter of practice, the putative
joint employers jointly determine, share, or allocate the
ability to direct, control, or supervise the worker, whether by
direct or indirect means;
(2) Whether, formally or as a matter of practice, the putative
joint employers jointly determine, share, or allocate the
power to—directly or indirectly—hire or fire the worker or
modify the terms or conditions of the worker’s employment;
(3) The degree of permanency and duration of the
relationship between the putative joint employers;
(4) Whether through shared management or a direct or
indirect ownership interest, one putative joint employer
controls, is controlled by, or is under common control with
the other putative joint employer;
(5) Whether the work is performed on a premises owned or
controlled by one or more of the putative joint employers,
independently or in connection with one another; and
(6) Whether, formally or as a matter of practice, the putative
joint employers jointly determine, share, or allocate
responsibility over functions ordinarily carried out by an
employer, such as handling payroll; providing workers’
compensation insurance; paying payroll taxes; or providing
the facilities, equipment, tools, or materials necessary to
complete the work.99
As demonstrated in Part III of this Article, the Fourth Circuit’s joint
employment test in Salinas provides a vehicle with which to extend
employment protections to gig and other contingent workers, including those
in the ridesharing business.100 Another such vehicle is the ABC test adopted

98. Id. citing 29 C.F.R. § 791.2.
99. Id. at 141–42; see also Hall v. DIRECTV, LLC, 846 F.3d 757, 769–70 (4th Cir.
2017).
100. Salinas, 848 F.3d 125.
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by the California Supreme Court in Dynamex Operations West, Inc. v.
Superior Court.101
III.
ALTERNATIVE/CONTINGENT WORK ARRANGEMENTS:
APPLYING TRADITIONAL TESTS AND EXPLORING NEW ONES
A.

Alternative Approaches to Gig Classification

The traditional tests to determine whether a worker is an “employee”
or “independent contractor” are less than helpful in characterizing workers
who perform “crowdsourced work” or other virtual work.102 Websites such
as Amazon.com’s Mechanical Turk,103 have created new forms of work never
contemplated by the FLSA or at common law. In the crowdsourcing model,
firms post digital tasks to online platforms where workers can accept and
complete particular tasks. Amazon and other crowdsourcing vendors “serve[]
as conduit[s] for the worker to submit the completed work, and for the firm
to pay the worker.”104 Crowdsourcing vendors typically require workers and
firms to sign their “click-wrap agreements” with pre-populated terms.
Workers and firms only negotiate rates of pay and the specifics of the tasks
to be performed; the vendor controls all the rest.105
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk platform places a number of other
restrictions on the crowdsourcing relationship, including payment of
Amazon’s service fee and a prohibition against firms and workers contracting
independently and outside the scope of Amazon’s agreement.106 Amazon
also demands that workers perform services as independent contractors.107
Despite the fact that Amazon dictates the fundamental terms of the
crowdsourcing relationships, to date, it has successfully avoided employer
obligations and liability based on the terms of its unilateral worker contracts.
Two factors have helped to accomplish this result: (1) characterizing the
101. 416 P.3d 1, 48–50 (Cal. 2018).
102. In “crowdsourcing,” computers automate and breakdown tasks and source out the
work to be performed. The workers who perform the tasks are commonly referred to as
“clickworkers.” See Miriam A. Cherry, Working for (Virtually) Minimum Wage: Applying the
Fair Labor Standards Act in Cyberspace, 60 ALA. L. REV. 1077, 1088–1089 (2009).
103. Amazon’s Mechanical Turk is one of the most prominent crowdsourcing websites.
The “turkers” may perform a variety of tasks, including tagging photos and comparing
products, and receive payment in the form of credits from the Amazon.com website. Id. at
1089.
104. See Caleb Holloway, Keeping Freedom in Freelance: It’s Time for Gig Firms and
Gig Workers to Update Their Relationship Status, 16 WAKE FOREST J. BUS. & INTELL. PROP.
L. 298, 312 (Spring 2016) (quoting A. Felstiner, Working the Crowd: Employment and Labor
Law in the Crowdsourcing Industry, 32 BERKELEY J. EMPL. & LAB. L. 143, 148 (2011)).
105. Id. at 313.
106. Id.
107. Felstiner, supra note 104, at 163 (noting that Amazon’s unilateral contract with
workers also informs them that they “will not be entitled to any employee benefits[] and will
not be eligible to recover worker’s compensation if injured.”).
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work as piecework rather than hourly work, and (2) the fact that Amazon
itself is “not involved in the actual transaction between workers and firms.”108
Similar challenges to the definition of work have emerged with
ridesharing companies like Lyft and Uber, which provide platforms for the
performance of non-virtual work. In such “gig work,” the consumer actually
hires the worker to provide rides through the mobile app platform
provided.109 Drivers are hired as independent contractors and approved
online and, once approved, can access the app and start accepting trips.110
Although Uber drivers are able to choose their own days and hours of work
and use their own vehicles, Uber has contracted with third parties to help
drivers lease vehicles and obtain insurance and coverage.111 Uber also sets
rates, collects payment from the consumer via its app, and controls certain
aspects of driver performance—such as the ability to terminate drivers with
low acceptance rates.112
While Uber has attempted to defend certain worker misclassification
cases by claiming that it is a “technology company” and not a “transportation
company,” there is no question that its drivers are integral to the company’s
business.113 The fact that Uber relies on its workers to perform the essence
of the business, in contrast to “turkers,” who are not at the core of Amazon’s
business, is another reason why Amazon has managed to avoid worker
misclassification suits by freelancers performing tasks through its
Mechanical Turk. Under the traditional tests used to determine “employee”
versus “independent contractor” status, courts view the worker’s economic
dependence and whether the tasks performed are integral to the company’s
business as critical factors in the analysis favoring employment.114 Uber
workers tend to meet these criteria more often than freelancers who work
through Mechanical Turk; otherwise, the control asserted over the “turkers”
by Amazon and that exerted over drivers by Uber is essentially the same.
In reality, all of these workers straddle the line between “independent
contractor” and “employee” with no easy demarcation between the two.
While all commentators and the courts acknowledge difficulties in applying
the traditional employee-independent contractor dichotomy to gig workers,
they have very different approaches to reconciling the two.
108. Holloway, supra note 104, at 314–15. Notably, Amazon also retains the right to
terminate a worker’s contract at any time and thereby prevent the worker from continuing to
perform work through its platform.
109. See generally Andrew G. Malik, Note, Worker Classification and the Gig-Economy,
69 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 1729, 1746–47 (2017).
110. Id. at 1747–48.
111. Id. at 1748.
112. O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 201 F. Supp. 3d 1110, 1152 (N.D. Cal. 2016); see
Uber Fees: How Much Does Uber Pay, Actually? (With Case Studies), RIDESTER,
https://www.ridester.com/uber-fees/ (last updated Jan. 17, 2019).
113. O’Connor, 201 F. Supp. 3d at 1137.
114. See, e.g., Bartels v. Birmingham, 332 U.S. 126 (1947); Saleem v. Corp. Transp.
Grp., Ltd., 854 F.3d 131, 141–46 (2d Cir. 2017).
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Some commentators suggest that a new classification of worker
should emerge to cover individuals who perform gig work. This new
classification of worker has been variously described in the literature as a
“dependent contractor”115 or an “independent employee.”116 It is designed to
offer greater protections to gig workers “who are not as autonomous as
independent contractors but who also are not subject to the same degree of
instruction and supervision as traditional employees.”117 As a variation on
this theme, there are those who propose a new test to determine whether gig
workers qualify as employees,118 and others who extend certain protections
to gig workers—such as the right to bargain—regardless of their
classification as independent contractors or employees.119
Still, other commentators advocate that gig workers should be
classified as “employees” without proposing a new test for classification
based on the degree of control exerted by the company providing the app or
platform120 or, from a policy standpoint, because the workers are low wage
earners or marginalized.121
There are also commentators who argue that there is no need to make
any changes at this juncture, instead adopting a “wait and see” attitude to
allow free market forces time to flush out the issues.122 These commentators
appear to be more concerned with stifling economic growth in the gig
economy than with extending worker protections at significant costs to gig
companies.123

115. See Cherry, supra note 102, at 651 (proposing employee status as a default rule to
extend protection to gig workers with “safe harbors [available] for people who are genuinely
sharing in such a way that paid work is secondary or tertiary to their goals.”). The authors
thereby distinguish “worker protection and coverage of those who are using platforms as an
equivalent to professional employment, while exempting those who are using these platforms
to create community.” Id. at 640. See also Lauren Weber, What If There Were a New Type of
Worker? Dependent Contractor, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 28, 2015).
116. Michael Nadler, Independent Employees: A New Category of Workers for the Gig
Economy, 19 N.C. J. L.& TECH. 443, 481 (2018).
117. Id. at 495.
118. See, e.g., Peter Gibbins, Extending Employee Protections to Gig-Economy Workers
Through the Entrepreneurial Opportunity Test of FedEx Home Delivery, 57 WASH. U. J.L. &
POL’Y 183, 194–202 (2018).
119. See Maria Lau, Workers in the “Gig” Economy: The Case for Extending the
Antitrust Labor Exemption, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1543, 1546–47 (2018) (advocating
extension of the antitrust labor exemption to encompass gig economy workers, regardless of
classification, “by legislation or possibly through interpretation, which would allow them to
take collective action in dealing with the platform/intermediary without violating antitrust
laws.”).
120. See Brishen Rogers, Employment Rights in the Platform Economy: Getting Back to
Basics, 10 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 479, 513 (2016).
121. Robert Sprague, Worker (Mis)Classification in the Sharing Economy: Square Pegs
Trying to Fit in Round Holes, 31 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMPL. L. 53, 74 (2015).
122. Holloway, supra note 104, at 327.
123. Id. at 326–334.
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A final approach argues against blanket classifications for gig
workers, since there is a wide variation in how they work and, instead, posits
that gig workers should be classified on a case-by-case basis.124
B.

Using Nontraditional Models to Protect Gig Workers While
Safeguarding Flexibility in Their Work

As noted above, there are two existing theories that could extend
protections to gig workers without sacrificing the flexibility central to their
work: the Fourth Circuit’s joint employment test articulated in Salinas v.
Commercial Interiors, Inc.125 and the ABC test adopted by the California
Supreme Court in Dynamex.126
Unlike the traditional common law right-to-control test or the
economic realities test, the joint employment test pronounced in Salinas is
helpful in analyzing the nature of triangular relationships like those created
through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. The firm hiring the worker and
Amazon are interrelated in establishing work parameters and in defining the
terms of the relationship. In fact, Amazon’s control over the worker is greater
than that of the firm, whose role is limited to negotiating rates of pay and
assigning the tasks to be performed. But it is the relationship of the putative
employers that determines employee status in Salinas,127 and on the
Mechanical Turk platform, Amazon and its participating firms together
“codetermine . . . the essential terms and conditions of the worker’s
employment.”128 On this basis, the “turkers” emerge as employees entitled
to protection under federal and state labor and employment laws.
Application of the ABC test referenced in Dynamex129 produces a
similar result for workers in the ridesharing business. The ABC test
presumes an employment relationship unless the hiring party demonstrates
all of the following:
(A) that the worker is free from the control and direction of
the hirer in connection with performance of the work, both
124. Robert L. Redfearn III, Sharing Economy Misclassification: Employees and
Independent Contractors in Transportation Network Cos., 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1023,
1054 (2016).
125. 848 F.3d 125, 125 (4th Cir. 2017).
126. 416 P.3d 1, 48–50 (Cal. 2018), pets. for modification and reh. denied, 2018 Cal.
LEXIS 3208 (Cal. Apr. 30, 2018).
127. 848 F.3d at 141.
128. Id. at 142.
129. 416 P.3d at 32. Although the Dynamex test’s language has broad application, recent
decisions applying Dynamex have concluded that the ABC test applies only to wage-order
claims and not to claims predicated solely on California’s Labor Code. See, e.g., Garcia v.
Border Transp. Grp., 28 Cal. App. 5th 558, 565 (Ct. App. 2018) (applying Borello standard to
non-wage-order claims); Karl v. Zimmer Biomet Holdings, Inc., No. C 18-04176 WHA, 2018
WL 5809428, *1, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 6, 2018) (“The ABC test applies only to claims arising
under Industrial Welfare Commission Wage Orders.”).
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under the contract for the performance of such work and in
fact; (B) that the worker performs work that is outside the
usual course of the hiring party’s business; and (C) that the
worker is customarily engaged in an independently
established trade, occupation, or business of the same nature
as the work performed for the hiring entity.130
Under the ABC test, Uber drivers would be classified as employees,
because the company cannot satisfy at least two parts of the test needed for
independent contractor status. Not only does Uber exert control over its
drivers based on certain rules, fare collection, and pricing, but also, without
question, the drivers’ work is an integral part of Uber’s business. Indeed,
without its drivers, Uber has no business.
CONCLUSION
The trend toward gig and other contingent work is a natural
consequence of technological advances that are expected to grow
exponentially in the twenty-first century. While the flexibility associated
with gig work is attractive to those seeking more work-life balance,
supplemental income, or both, there are social and economic risks and costs
related to that work. There are likewise significant costs to companies
engaged in contingent work who misclassify their workers either
intentionally or because the prevailing definitions of employee and
independent contractor simply do not fit the “gig lifestyle.” Therefore, new
paradigms are needed to reconcile the unique demands associated with gig
and other contingent work.
Because the legislative process reacts slowly to new challenges and
because contingent workers are less than a priority, it is unlikely that
Congress will move to protect these workers in the immediate future. In the
meantime, contingent workers are growing in number and becoming
increasingly marginalized. Those who are classified as independent
contractors lack the bargaining and earning power traditionally associated
with bona fide independent contractors. Ever-dependent on the “gig,” their
work life hangs in a delicate balance. However, there are immediate
solutions without legislative action. Expanding the scope and application of
the ABC test and modern joint employment doctrine are two alternative
solutions to this growing problem.

130. Id. at 35.

